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1. Introduction and background
In 1962, Clifford Spector used a recursion principle on well-founded trees, known as bar recursion, to give a
characterization of the provably recursive functionals of full second-order arithmetic [14]. In this work, Spector extended
Gödel’s dialectica interpretation of 1958 [8] from arithmetic to analysis, relying on bar recursion and extending this notion
to all finite types.
In the present work, the reader is assumed to be familiar with Gödel’s dialectica interpretation (for details, see [1,12]).
Similarly to the usual recursion and induction, bar recursion is a principle of definition with a corresponding principle
of proof, known as bar induction. In [14], Spector also briefly presents the notion of bar induction. It is referred as a
generalization of Brouwer’s bar theorem [3] to higher types.
A few years later, in 1968, William Howard proved that the scheme of bar induction has a dialectica interpretation also
relying on bar recursive functionals [9].
In 2005, Fernando Ferreira and Paulo Oliva presented in [5] a new interpretation, the so-called bounded functional
interpretation, which is based on a new assignment of formulas A  AB := ∃˜b∀˜c AB(b, c) and relies essentially on the
notion of majorizability. The bounded functional interpretation has similarities to Ulrich Kohlenbach’s monotone functional
interpretation (introduced in [11]), in the sense that it does not care for precise witnesses, but instead cares for their bounds
and it can be used to prove similar results.
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The strong majorizability relations,≤∗, were introduced by Bezem in [2] (after the work of Howard [10]):
x ≤∗0 y := x ≤ y
x ≤∗ρ→σ y := ∀uρ, vρ (u ≤∗ρ v→ xu ≤∗σ yv ∧ yu ≤∗σ yv).
In the above mentioned paper, Bezem defines the structureMω of the strongly majorizable functionals and proves that
the bar recursive functionals are well defined in this structure (note that they are not well-defined in the set-theoretical
type structure).
Ferreira and Oliva’s interpretation is carried out in a new setting, based on intensional relations. Heyting arithmetic in
all finite types is extended with intensional relations E (one for each finite type) and is denoted by HAωE .
The relations E are the intensional counterpart of Bezem’s strong majorizability relations ruled by the axioms
x E0 y↔ x ≤ y,
x Eρ→σ y→ ∀u Eρ v(xu Eσ yv ∧ yu Eσ yv)
and by the following rule, denoted by RLE,
Abd ∧ u Eρ v→ su Eσ tv ∧ tu Eσ tv
Abd → s Eρ→σ t
where Abd is an intensional bounded formula (meaning that every quantifier in the formula is bounded) and u and v are
variables which do not appear in the conclusion of the rule. The relations are called intensional as they are partly governed
by the rule presented above.
This interpretation is not set-theoretically faithful, since its characteristic principles ‘‘inject uniformities" (obtaining
majorizing witnesses independent from certain parameters) which contradict certain set-theoretical truths. For instance,
it refutes the axiom of extensionality. Furthermore, the bounded functional interpretation interprets new principles which
have no analogue in the dialectica or monotone interpretations, such as a very general form of Brouwer’s FAN theorem as
well as certain non-intuitionistic principles like weak König’s lemma or the lesser limited principle of omniscience. For
more details and some discussions on dialectica, bounded and monotone interpretations, we suggest [7,6,12]. Throughout
this work, we assume that the reader is familiar with the bounded functional interpretation, type-theoretical notations and
with the intensional theory HAωE .
Recently, Ferreira and the author proved in [4] that the non-intuitionistic law of the double negation shift (DNS) has
a bounded functional interpretation with bar recursive functionals of finite type. Following the work of Spector, this
interpretation is enough to ensure that the negative translation of full numerical comprehension has a bounded functional
interpretation. Therefore, full numerical comprehension is compatiblewith the uniformities introduced by the characteristic
principles of the bounded functional interpretation in the classical case.
The purpose of this work is to show that the scheme of bar induction has a bounded functional interpretation. The
argument of the proof is an adaptation of the one given byHoward in [9], relying also on bar recursive functionals. This result
is verified in the intensional Heyting arithmetic in all finite types extendedwith bar recursive functionals plus a particular set
of universal sentences, denoted by ∆Mω and containing all universal sentences with bounded intensional matrices whose
‘‘flattenings’’ hold in Mω of majorizable functionals. By flattening, we mean the passageway from the intensional to the
extensional formulas, obtained by replacing all occurrences of E by the strong majorizability relations≤∗. In our treatment,
we rely on∆Mω . Even thoughmany statements of∆Mω can be proved inHAωE , we nevertheless choose to rely in∆Mω because
it eases reading and avoids distractions from the results themselves. However, we must point out that some uses of ∆Mω
seem to be essential, e.g. for proving that the bar recursors aremajorizable in the intensional sense. A thorough investigation
of the need of using sentences of∆Mω would require further studies.
Following an observation of Ferreira, it is proved that the axiom of dependent choices (in the classical case) is a
consequence of the interpretation of a restricted form of the scheme of bar induction. This result answers an open question
which surfaced in [4] and provides an alternativeway to prove that numerical comprehension is interpreted by the bounded
functional interpretation. Furthermore, while the proof of this result viaDNS uses a form of ineffective choice called tameAC,
that is not needed in the proof via dependent choices.
The author would like to thank Fernando Ferreira for his invaluable observations, as well as for his guidance and several
meetings and conversations during the preparation of this work.
2. The bounded functional interpretation extended to bar recursors
In this section, we briefly present the extension of the bounded functional interpretation to bar recursors. For further
details, see [4].
The language ofHAωE is extendedwith new constants B
ρ,σ , the bar recursive functionals which follow the defining axioms
BRρ,σ :
∀ψ (0→ρ)→0, zτ1 , uτ2 , n0, s0→ρ∀i ≤0 k
 
ψs, n <0 n→ Bρ,σi ψzuns =σi zins, n

∧ ψs, n ≥0 n→ Bρ,σi ψzuns =σi ui λx.Bρ,σi ψzu(n+ 1)(s, n ∗ x) ns, n ,
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where τ1 = (0 → ((0→ ρ)→ σ) , τ2 = (ρ → σ) → (0→ ((0→ ρ)→ σ)), ρ, σ are tuples of k + 1 entries and
(s, n)0→τ and (s, n ∗ x)0→τ are defined by
s, n k =τ

sk, if k < n
0, otherwise
(s, n ∗ x)k =τ
 sk, if k < n
x, if k = n
0, otherwise.
Note that whereas s0→ρ denotes an infinite sequence of objects of type ρ, s, n, although formally of type 0→ ρ as well,
stands for the initial subsequence of swith length n, ⟨s0, s1, . . . , sn−1, 0, 0, . . .⟩, and s, n ∗ x is the concatenation of the finite
sequence s, nwith x.
In fact, we take simultaneous bar recursion with tuples of variables, following the treatment of Kohlenbach in [12].
Nevertheless, we omitted (and will omit) the tuple notation, in order to ease reading. Let BR denote the collection of all
statements BRρ,σ for ρ, σ tuples of types. For details, see [14,13,12] or [1].
The scheme of bar induction applied to formulas P and Q is given by
BI : Hyp1 ∧ Hyp2 ∧ Hyp3 ∧ Hyp4→ Q (0, 0),
where
Hyp1 : ∀s0→ρ∃n0 P(s, n, n)
Hyp2 : ∀s0→ρ, n0∀m ≤0 n

P(s,m,m)→ P(s, n, n)
Hyp3 : ∀s0→ρ, n0 P(s, n, n)→ Q (s, n, n)
Hyp4 : ∀s0→ρ, n0 ∀xρ Q (s, n ∗ x, n+ 1)→ Q (s, n, n)
and 0 = λn0.0ρ . The hypothesis Hyp1–Hyp4 also entail Q (s, n, n) for all s0→ρ and n0 (Hyp2 is essential to obtain this
generalization). It is well known that we can argue by bar induction in the structure of majorizable functionalsMω (see, for
instance, [12]).
As described in the introduction, let∆Mω be the set of all universal sentences (with intensional boundedmatrices) whose
flattenings hold in the structureMω of majorizable functionals. The following results concern the theory HAωE + BR+∆Mω
and rely on some facts of∆Mω . Although the statements of BR are universal and their flattenings are true inMω , we will use
HAωE + BR+∆Mω instead of HAωE +∆Mω . This clearly indicates that our language contains the bar recursor functionals.
For details on the next results, see [4].
Theorem 1. HAωE + BR + ∆Mω is a majorizability theory (i.e, for every closed term q there exists a closed term t such that
HAωE + BR+∆Mω ⊢ q E t).
SinceHAωE+BR+∆Mω is amajorizability theory and the sentences of BR+∆Mω are universal (and so, self-interpretable),
we have:
Theorem 2 (Soundness). Let A(z) be a formula of the language of HAωE + BR + ∆Mω with free variables z and assume that its
bounded functional interpretation is given by ∃˜b∀˜c AB(z, b, c). If
HAωE + BR+∆Mω + Pω[E] ⊢ A(z)
then, there are monotone closed terms t of appropriate type such that
HAωE + BR+∆Mω ⊢ ∀˜a∀z E a∀˜c AB(z, ta, c).
Moreover,Mω proves ∀˜a∀z ≤∗ a∀˜c (AB)∗(z, ta, c).
In the previous result, A∗ denotes the flattening of the formula A (i.e, the formula obtained by replacing all relation
symbols E by the corresponding strong majorizability relation ≤∗) and Pω[E] stands for the set of characteristic principles
of the bounded functional interpretation for the intuitionistic theory, presented in [5]:
1. Bounded choice principle bACω
bACρ,τ : ∀xρ∃yτ A(x, y)→ ∃˜f ∀˜b∀x E b∃y E fb A(x, y),
where A is an arbitrary formula of the language;
2. Bounded independence of premise principle bIPω∀bd
bIPρ∀bd :
∀x Abd(x)→ ∃yρ B(y)→ ∃˜b∀x Abd(x)→ ∃y E b B(y),
where Abd is a bounded formula and B is an arbitrary formula;
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3. Bounded Markov’s principle bMPωbd
bMPρbd :
∀yρ∀x Abd(x, y)→ Bbd→ ∃˜b ∀y E b∀x Abd(x, y)→ Bbd,
where Abd and Bbd are bounded formulas. When Bbd is⊥ it gives
¬∀y∀x Abd(x, y)→ ∃˜b¬∀y E b∀x Abd(x, y)
which implies the particular version
¬¬∃y Abd(y)→ ∃˜b¬¬∃y E b Abd(y);
4. Bounded universal disjunction principle bUDω∀bd
bUD
ρ,τ
∀bd : ∀˜bρ ∀˜cτ
∀x E b Abd(x) ∨ ∀y E c Bbd(y)→ ∀x Abd(x) ∨ ∀y Bbd(y),
where Abd and Bbd are bounded formulas;
5. Bounded contra collection principle bBCCωbd
bBCC
ρ,τ
bd : ∀˜cρ
∀˜bτ∃z E c∀y E b Abd(y, z)→ ∃z E c∀y Abd(y, z),
where Abd is a bounded formula;
6. Majorizability axiomsMAJω
MAJρ : ∀xρ∃yρ (x E y).
3. The bounded functional interpretation of bar induction
In this section, we prove the main result of this paper:
Theorem 3.
HAωE + BR+∆Mω + Pω[E] ⊢ BI.
This result together with the soundness theorem stated in the previous section ensures that bar induction has a bounded
functional interpretation.
The proof is an adaptation of the one given byHoward in [9]. Nevertheless it relies essentially on the following statements
of∆Mω , denoted byMωBR:
MBR
ρ,σ : ∀˜ψ, z, u∀n0∀s0→ρ∀r0→ρ

∀i < n (si E ri)→ (Bρ,σ )pψzuns E (Bρ,σ )pψzunr

with ψ, z and u tuples of appropriate types and Bpψzuns, defined in [12], given by
zn(s, nM) if ψs, nM < n
max

zn(s, nM), u (λx.Bpψzu(n+ 1)(s, n ∗ x)) n(s, nM) otherwise
where sM(n) stands for maxi≤n s(i). Again, we omitted and will omit in the proof the tuple notation to ease reading.
Kohlenbach proves in [12] that the flattenings of these statements hold inMω , hence they are in∆Mω .
Proof. Take P and Q formulas of the language and assume that
Hyp1 : ∀s∃n P(s, n, n)
Hyp2 : ∀s, n∀m ≤ n P(s,m,m)→ P(s, n, n)
Hyp3 : ∀s, n P(s, n, n)→ Q (s, n, n)
Hyp4 : ∀s, n ∀x Q (s, n ∗ x, n+ 1)→ Q (s, n, n).
We want to prove Q (0, 0).
Notice that, in HAωE + BR+∆Mω + Pω[E], P and Q are equivalent to their bounded functional interpretations. Assume
P(s, n)
B = ∃˜a∀˜b PB(s, n, a, b)
Q (s, n)
B = ∃˜c∀˜d QB(s, n, c, d).
Therefore, from Hyp1–Hyp4, it follows
∀s∃n∃˜a∀˜b PB(s, n, n, a, b) (1)
∀s, n∀m ≤ n ∃˜a1∀˜b1 PB(s,m,m, a1, b1)→ ∃˜a2∀˜b2 PB(s, n, n, a2, b2) (2)
∀s, n ∃˜a∀˜b PB(s, n, n, a, b)→ ∃˜c∀˜d QB(s, n, n, c, d) (3)
∀s, n ∀x∃˜c1∀˜d1 QB(s, n ∗ x, n+ 1, c1, d1)→ ∃˜c2∀˜d2 QB(s, n, n, c2, d2). (4)
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Concerning (1), by the bounded choice principle, there exists a monotone f such that
∀˜s∀s′ E s∃n ≤ fs∃˜a∀˜b PB(s′, n, n, a, b)
and by (2), it follows ∀˜s∀s′ E s∃˜a∀˜b PB(s′, fs, fs, a, b). Collection entails
∀˜s∃˜a∀s′ E s∃˜a′ E a∀˜b PB(s′, fs, fs, a′, b)
and since PB is monotone in the entry of a′, we get
∀˜s∃˜a∀s′ E s∀˜b PB(s′, fs, fs, a, b).
By bounded axiom of choice, there exists a monotone g such that
∀˜s∃˜a E gs∀s′ E s∀˜b PB(s′, fs, fs, a, b)
and by monotonicity of PB on the entry of a, it follows
∀˜s∀s′ E s∀˜b PB(s′, fs, fs, gs, b).
Now, let us focus on (2), which is equivalent to
∀s, n∀m ≤ n∀˜a1
∀˜b1 PB(s,m,m, a1, b1)→ ∃˜a2∀˜b2 PB(s, n, n, a2, b2).
By the bounded independence of premises bIPω∀bd, we get
∀s, n∀m ≤ n∀˜a1∃˜a2
∀˜b1 PB(s,m,m, a1, b1)→ ∃˜a′2 E a2∀˜b2 PB(s, n, n, a′2, b2)
and by the bounded choice principle bACω , there exists h, monotone, such that
∀˜s, n, a1∀m ≤ n∀s′ E s∃˜a2 E hsna1
∀˜b1 PB(s′,m,m, a1, b1)→ ∃˜a′2 E a2∀˜b2 PB(s′, n, n, a′2, b2).
The latter implies
∀˜s, n, a1∀m ≤ n∀s′ E s
∀˜b1 PB(s′,m,m, a1, b1)→ ∃˜a2 E hsna1∀˜b2 PB(s′, n, n, a2, b2)
and, by monotonicity of PB on entry of a2, it follows
∀˜s, n, a∀m ≤ n∀s′ E s ∀˜b PB(s′,m,m, a, b)→ ∀˜b PB(s′, n, n, hsna, b).
The hypothesis Hyp3 is equivalent to
∀s, n∀˜a ∀˜b PB(s, n, n, a, b)→ ∃˜c∀˜d QB(s, n, n, c, d).
As we did with Hyp2, by bIPω∀bd and bACω , there exists p, monotone, such that
∀˜s, n, a∀s′ E s ∀˜b PB(s′, n, n, a, b)→ ∃˜c E psna∀˜d QB(s′, n, n, c, d).
Since QB is monotone in the entry of c , we get
∀˜s, n, a∀s′ E s ∀˜b PB(s′, n, n, a, b)→ ∀˜d QB(s′, n, n, psna, d).
From (4), we get
∀s, n ∃˜f ∀˜a∀x E a∃˜c1 E fa∀˜d1 QB(s, n ∗ x, n+ 1, c1, d1)→ ∃˜c2∀˜d2 QB(s, n, c2, d2),
which implies
∀s, n∀˜f ∀˜a∀x E a∀˜d1 QB(s, n ∗ x, n+ 1, fa, d1)→ ∃˜c2∀˜d2 QB(s, n, c2, d2).
The bounded independence of the premises principle leads to
∀s, n∀˜f ∃˜c2
∀˜a∀x E a∀˜d1 QB(s, n ∗ x, n+ 1, fa, d1)→ ∃˜c ′2 E c2∀˜d2 QB(s, n, c ′2, d2)
and by the bounded choice principle, there exists a monotone φ such that
∀˜s, n, f ∀s′ E s∃˜c2 E φsnf
∀˜a∀x E a∀˜d1 QB(s′, n ∗ x, n+ 1, fa, d1)→ ∃˜c ′2 E c2∀˜d2 QB(s′, n, c ′2, d2).
The monotonicity of QB in the entry of c2 entails
∀˜s, n, f ∀s′ E s ∀˜a∀x E a∀˜d QB(s′, n ∗ x, n+ 1, fa, d)→ ∀˜d QB(s′, n, φsnf , d).
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At this point, from Hyp1–Hyp4, we have showed that there exist monotone f , g, h, p and φ such that
∀˜s∀s′ E s∀˜b PB(s′, fs, fs, gs, b) (5)
∀˜s, n, a∀m ≤ n∀s′ E s ∀˜b PB(s′,m,m, a, b)→ ∀˜b PB(s′, n, n, hsna, b) (6)
∀˜s, n, a∀s′ E s ∀˜b PB(s′, n, n, a, b)→ ∀˜d QB(s′, n, n, psna, d) (7)
∀˜s, n, f ∀s′ E s ∀˜a∀x E a∀˜d QB(s′, n ∗ x, n+ 1, fa, d)→→ ∀˜d QB(s′, n, n, φsnf , d). (8)
We want to prove ∃˜w∀˜d QB(0, 0, w, d)which is equivalent to Q (0, 0) (by the characterization theorem).
In order to do so, defineWsn := Bpfzuns, with
zns = psn (hsn (gs))
ulns = φsnl.
Observe that z and u are monotone, since f , g, p, h, φ are all monotone. ByMBR, for n and s such that ∀i < n (si E si),Wsn
is monotone. In particularW00 is monotone.
We claim that withw defined byW00, we have ∀˜d Q (0, 0, w, d). In order to do so, we prove the following results:
Lemma 4. HAωE + BR+∆Mω + Pω[E] proves that for all n0 and s′, s of type 0→ ρ such that ∀i < n (s′i E si), if f

s, nM

< n,
then
∀˜d QB

s′, n, n,Ws, n n, d

.
Before proving the above lemma, notice that for all n ∈ N and s, r ∈ MNρ , if ∀i < n (si ≤∗ ri), then ∀i (s, n i ≤∗ r, n, i) is
provable inMω . Consequently, inMω we have s, n ≤∗ r, nM ∧ s, nM ≤∗ r, nM . Therefore,∆Mω contains the statements
∀n0∀s0→ρ∀r0→ρ ∀i < n (si E ri)→ s, n E r, nM ∧ s, nM E r, nM .
Notice, also, that until the end of the proof, we may use facts, such as Abd(s, n ∗ sn)↔ Abd(s, n+ 1), with Abd a bounded
formula. Such a statement is in∆Mω .
Proof. Take n, s and s′ such that ∀i < n s′i E si and assume f s, nM < n. Then s′, n E s, nM . By (5), we have
∀˜b PB

s′, n, f

s, nM

, f

s, nM

, g

s, nM

, b

.
Since f s, nM < n, then
∀˜b PB

s′, f

s, nM

, f

s, nM

, g

s, nM

, b

and by (6), it follows ∀˜b PB

s′, n, n, h

s, nM

n

g

s, nM

, b

. The latter and (7) entail
∀˜d QB

s′, n, n, p

s, nM

n

h

s, nM

n

g

s, nM

, d

which is equivalent to ∀˜d QB

s′, n, n,Ws, n n, d

. 
Lemma 5. HAωE + BR+∆Mω + Pω[E] proves that for all n0 and s′, s of type 0→ ρ such that ∀i < n (s′i E si), if f

s, nM
 ≥ n,
then
∀˜a, d∀x E a QB

s′, n ∗ x, n+ 1,W (s, n ∗ a) (n+ 1), d→ ∀˜d QB s′, n, n,Ws, n n, d .
Proof. Take n, s′ and s such that ∀i < n (s′i E si). Then s′, n E s, nM . Assume f s, nM ≥ n. Defineψ = λx.W (s, n ∗ x) (n+
1). By the definition ofW ,
ψ = λx.Bpfzu(n+ 1)(s, n ∗ x).
Using the rule RLE together withMBR, it is straightforward to show that ψ is monotone, since f , z and u are monotone and
∀i < n (si E si). By (8), we get
∀˜a∀x E a∀˜d QB

s′, n ∗ x, n+ 1, ψa, d→ ∀˜d QBs′, n, n, φs, nMnψ, d,
which is equivalent to
∀˜a∀x E a∀˜d QB

s′, n ∗ x, n+ 1,W (s, n ∗ a) (n+ 1), d→ ∀˜d QBs′, n, n, φ s, nM n (λx.W (s, n ∗ x) (n+ 1)) , d.
The latter entails
∀˜a∀x E a∀˜d QB

s′, n ∗ x, n+ 1,W (s, n ∗ a) (n+ 1), d→ ∀˜d QB s′, n, n,Ws, n n , d,
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since QB is monotone in the entry ofWs, n n and this is the maximum between
p

s, nM

n

h

s, nM

n

g

s, nM
 
and
φ

s, nM

n

λx.Bpfzu(n+ 1)(s, n ∗ x) . 
By Lemmas 4 and 5, we get
∀i < n (s′i E si)→ ∀˜a∀x E a∀˜d QB s′, n ∗ x, n+ 1,W (s, n ∗ a)(n+ 1), d→ ∀˜d QBs′, n, n,Ws, n, n, d
for all n, s, s′. Equivalently, we have
∀i < n (s′i E si)→ ∀˜a∀x E a∀˜d′ QB s′, n ∗ x, n+ 1,W (s, n ∗ a) (n+ 1), d′→ ∀˜d′ E d QB s′, n, n,Ws, n n, d′ 
for all n, s, s′.
The bounded Markov and the independence of premises principles imply that for all n, s, s′ and monotone d, there exist
monotone a and d′ such that
∀i < n (s′i E si)→ ∃˜a′ E a, d′′ E d′

∀˜a′′ E a′∀x E a′′∀˜d′′′ E d′′
QB

s′, n ∗ x, n+ 1,W s, n ∗ a′′ (n+ 1), d′′′→ ∀˜d′ E d QBs′, n, n,Ws, n n, d′.
Hence, we have
∀n, s, s′∀˜d∃˜a, d′

∀i < n (s′i E si)→ ∀˜a′ E a∀x E a′∀˜d′′ E d′
QB

s′, n ∗ x, n+ 1,W s, n ∗ a′ (n+ 1), d′′→ ∀˜d′ E d QBs′, n, n,Ws, n n, d′.
By the bounded choice principle, there exist monotone closed functionals u and v such that for n, for monotone s∗, s∗∗, d
and for s′ E s∗, s E s∗∗ such that ∀i < n (s′i E si), then
∀˜a E uns∗s∗∗d∀x E a∀˜d′ E vns∗s∗∗d QB

s′, n ∗ x, n+ 1,W (s, n ∗ a) (n+ 1), d′ (9)
→ ∀˜d′ ▹ d QB

s′, n, n,Ws, n n, d′

.
To simplify the notation, let D(s, n, r, d) denote ∀d′ E d QB(s, n,Wrn, d′) and define u′ and v′ by
u′nsd = unssd
v′nsd = vnssd.
From (9), we have
∀˜a E u′ns∗d∀x E a Ds′, n ∗ x, n+ 1, s, n ∗ a, v′ns∗d→ D(s′, n, n, s, n, d) (10)
for all monotone n, s∗, d and for s′ E s∗, s E s∗ such that ∀i < n (s′i E si).
For all monotone d, define recursively ⟨a, b⟩ by
⟨a, b⟩0 := ⟨u′00d, v′00d⟩
⟨a, b⟩(k+ 1) := u′(k+ 1)(s Mk+1 )bk, v′(k+ 1)(s Mk+1 )bk,
where
ski =

ai if i < k
0 otherwise
for k > 0.
Lemma 6. HAω + BR+∆Mω + Pω[E] proves that, given d monotone and ak and bk defined as above (depending on d), then ak
and bk are monotone for all k.
Proof. We argue by induction on k. For k = 0, it is clear since u′, v′, 0 and d are monotone. As an induction hypothesis,
assume ai and bi are monotone for all i < k. Then, s Mk is monotone since ∀i (ski ≤∗ ski) → s Mk ≤∗ s Mk holds in Mω
(implying that sMk E s
M
k is in∆Mω ). Now, using the induction hypothesis, the conclusion comes easily since u
′ and v′ are both
monotone. 
Now, we can prove the following:
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Lemma 7. HAω + BR+∆Mω + Pω[E] proves that, given d monotone and ak and bk defined as above, if
(∀i ≤ k (ci E ai ∧ xi E ci))→ D(⟨x0, . . . , xk, 0, 0, ...⟩, k+ 1, ⟨c0, . . . , ck, 0, 0, ...⟩, bk),
holds for all c0, . . . , ck, x0, . . . , xk of the appropriate type, then we have D(0, 0, 0, d), for all k.
Proof. We argue by induction on k. For k = 0, it is straightforward by (10). For k+ 1, assume, as the induction hypothesis,
that the implication stated in the lemma holds for k.
Suppose
∀c0, . . . , ck+1, x0, . . . , xk+1
∀i ≤ k+ 1 (ci E ai ∧ xi E ci)
→ D(⟨x0, . . . , xk+1, 0, 0, ...⟩, k+ 2, ⟨c0, . . . , ck+1, 0, 0, ...⟩, bk+1)

,
which is equivalent to
∀c0, . . . , ck, x0, . . . , xk
∀i ≤ k (ci E ai ∧ xi E ci)→ ∀ck+1 E ak+1∀xk+1 E ck+1
D(⟨x0, . . . , xk, 0, 0, ...⟩, k+ 1 ∗ xk+1, k+ 2, ⟨c0, . . . , ck, 0, 0, ...⟩, k+ 1 ∗ ck+1, bk+1)

.
Observe that
ak+1 = u′(k+ 1)s Mk+1 bk
bk+1 = v′(k+ 1)s Mk+1 bk
⟨x0, . . . , xk, 0, 0, ...⟩ E s Mk+1
⟨c0, . . . , ck, 0, 0, ...⟩ E s Mk+1 (by the hypothesis of ∀i ≤ k (ci E ai ∧ xi E ci)).
By (10), it follows
∀c0, . . . , ck, x0, . . . , xk
∀i ≤ k (ci E ai ∧ xi E ci)
→ D(⟨x0, . . . , xk, 0, 0, ...⟩, k+ 1, k+ 1, ⟨c0, . . . , ck, 0, 0, ...⟩, k+ 1, bk)

.
Equivalently,
∀c0, . . . , ck, x0, . . . , xk
∀i ≤ k (ci E ai ∧ xi E ci) → D(⟨x0, . . . , xk, 0, 0, ...⟩, k+ 1, ⟨c0, . . . , ck, 0, 0, ...⟩, bk).
By the induction hypothesis, we get D(0, 0, 0, d), as desired. 
To finish the proof we also need the following result, known as Kreisel’s trick:
Lemma 8 (Kreisel’s Trick). HAω + BR + ∆Mω + Pω[E] proves that, given f of type (0 → ρ) → 0, then we can define θ
(depending on f ), by bar recursion, such that
∃k ≤ θs00 (f s, k < k)
for all s0→ρ .
Proof. Define θ as
θsrn =

0 if ∃k ≤ n f r, k < k
1+ θs(r, n ∗ sn)(n+ 1) otherwise.
θ is clearly obtained by bar recursion. Now, take an arbitrary s and define φi as φi = θs(s, i)i. Hence
φi =

0 if ∃k ≤ i f (s, k) < k
1+ φ(i+ 1) otherwise
since s, i ∗ si = s, i+ 1. Note that if φi ≠ 0 and j ≤ i, then φj = 1+φ(j+ 1). By induction on j, it is straightforward to show
that φi ≠ 0 ∧ j ≤ i → φ0 = j + φj since j + 1 + φ(j + 1) = j + φj. Choose j = i. Then, we get φi ≠ 0 → φ0 = i + φi
and taking i = φ0 this leads to φ(φ0) ≠ 0 → φ0 = φ0 + φ(φ0) → φ(φ0) = 0. Thus φ(φ0) = 0, which implies that
∃k ≤ θs00 (f (s, k) < k), as desired. 
Take d, monotone, and define ak, bk and sk as above. Define s∗ by s∗ = λn.an. Kreisel’s trick implies that k exists such
that f

s∗, kM

< k. Take s′ = ⟨x0, . . . , xk−1, 0, 0, ...⟩ and s = ⟨c0, . . . , ck−1, 0, 0, ...⟩ such that ∀i < k (xi E ci ∧ ci E ai).
Therefore, s′, k E s, kM . By (5), it follows that
∀˜b PB

s′, k, f

s, k
M
, f

s, k
M
, g

s, k
M
, b

.
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Since s, k
M
E s∗, kM , then f s, kM < k. By (6),
∀˜b PB

s′, k, k, h

s, k
M
k

g

s, k
M
, b

and (7) entails ∀˜d′ QB

s′, k, k, p

s, k
M
k

h

s, k
M
k

g

s, k
M
, d′

, which is equivalent to ∀˜d′ QB

s′, k, k,Ws, k k, d′

and to
∀˜d′ D s′, k, k, s, k, d′. In particular, we have D(s′, k, k, s, k, bk−1). We have shown that
∀i < k (ci E ai ∧ xi E ci)→ D(⟨x0, . . . , xk−1, 0, 0, ...⟩, k, ⟨c0, . . . , ck−1, 0, 0, ...⟩, bk−1)
for all c0, . . . , ck−1, x0, . . . , xk−1. By lemma (7), it follows D(0, 0, 0, d). Hence, ∀˜d D(0, 0, 0, d), which entails
∃˜w∀˜d QB(0, 0, w, d)withw = W (0, 0), as desired. 
Lemma 9.
HAω ⊢ BI→ BI∗
where BI∗ is the schema of bar induction with conclusion ∀s0→ρ, n0 Q (s, n, n).
Proof. Assume Hyp1–Hyp4 for formulas P and Q . Then, it follows that Q (0, 0). Take s0→ρ and n0 and define the following
P ′(r,m) := P(s, n ∗ r, n+m)
Q ′(r,m) := Q (s, n ∗ r, n+m),
where
(s, n ∗ r)i =

si, if i < n
r(i− n) otherwise.
We claim that
∀r∃m P ′(r,m). (11)
by Hyp1, ∃k P

s, n ∗ r, k, k

. If k ≥ n, takem = n− k. We get
P

s, n ∗ r,m, n+m, n+m

,
which is equivalent to P ′ (r,m,m). If k < n, Hyp2 ensures for m ≥ k that P

s, n ∗ r,m,m

. In particular, we have
P(s, n ∗ r,m, n+m).
∀r,m∀k ≤ m P ′(r, k, k)→ P ′(r,m,m) (12)
and
∀r, n P ′(r,m,m)→ Q ′(r,m,m) (13)
are trivial, by Hyp2 and Hyp3. Finally, we claim that
∀r,m ∀x Q ′(r,m ∗ x,m+ 1)→ Q ′(r,m,m). (14)
Take r,m and assume ∀x Q ′(r,m ∗ x,m+ 1), which is equivalent to
∀x Q (s, n ∗ (r,m ∗ x), n+m+ 1)
and to ∀x Q (s, n ∗ r,m, n+m ∗ x, n+m+ 1). By Hyp4, it follows that
Q (r, n ∗ r,m, n+m, n+m).
Hence, we have Q (s, n ∗ r,m, n+m) and Q ′(r,m,m). By (11)–(14), it follows that Q ′(0, 0), hence, we get Q (s, n, n). 
The following result is a trivial consequence of Theorem 3 and Lemma 9.
Corollary 10. HAωE + BR+∆Mω + Pω[E] proves that, under Hyp1–Hyp4 of BI, we also have Q (s, n, n) for all s and n.
Observe that in the previous proof, we used sentences of the form
A(s, n ∗ sn)↔ A(s, n+ 1)
for arbitrary formulas (P andQ in the particular case). These sentencesmay not be in∆Mω (we know that they are in the case
of bounded formulas). Nevertheless, in HAωE + BR+∆Mω + Pω[E], this equivalence for arbitrary formulas is a consequence
of the same equivalence for bounded formulas.
Note that to prove that the bar induction principle has a bounded functional interpretation, we needed to use some facts
of ∆M . Nevertheless no use has been made of the principle tameAC which was essential to show that the double negation
principle is interpretable by the bounded functional interpretation (see [4]).
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4. The classical case: dependent choices
In this section, we begin by observing that a straightforward consequence of the previous section is that in the classical
case, with its characteristic principles and BR, we also have bar induction with some restrictions. Moreover, we show that
this is enough to prove that the scheme of dependent choices has a bounded functional interpretation.
Let us denote BI∃bd as the schema of bar induction for formulas P and Q where P is an existential bounded formula and
Q is an arbitrary formula of the language. The interpretation within the classical case is done via a negative translation
(Gödel–Gentzen like) A  Ag . We begin by proving the following result.
Proposition 11.
HAωE + BR+∆Mω + Pω[E] ⊢ (BI∃bd)g .
Proof. From the previous section, we know that the schema BI holds in HAωE+BR+∆Mω +Pω[E]. Take n a natural number
and s0→ρ a sequence of objects of type ρ and let P(s, n) be an existential bounded formula ∃zσ R(s, n, z) and Q (s, n) an
arbitrary formula of the language. We want to prove that the negative translation of bar induction for formulas P and Q
(Hyp1 ∧ Hyp2 ∧ Hyp3 ∧ Hyp4)→ Q (0, 0)
holds in HAωE + BR+∆Mω + Pω[E].
Note that the negative translation of P(s, n) is given by ¬¬∃z (R(s, n, z))g and, by the bounded Markov principle, it is
equivalent to ∃˜z ¬¬∃z ′ E z (R(s, n, z ′))g , which will be denoted by A(s, n).
Then we get
(Hyp1)g is ∀s¬¬∃n A(s, n, n)
(Hyp2)g is ∀s, n∀m ≤ n (A(s,m,m)→ A(s, n, n))
(Hyp3)g is ∀s, n A(s, n, n)→ (Q (s, n, n))g
(Hyp4)g is ∀s, n ∀x (Q (s, n ∗ x, n+ 1))g → (Q (s, n, n))g .
Note that the bounded Markov principle entails that (Hyp1)g is equivalent to
∀s∃n¬¬∃n′ ≤ n A(s, n′, n′)
and, by (Hyp2)g , we get
∀s∃n¬¬ A(s, n, n).
Note also that (Hyp2)g implies
∀s, n∀m ≤ n (¬¬A(s,m,m)→ ¬¬A(s, n, n)) .
To end the proof, notice that ¬¬A(s, n) is
¬¬∃˜z¬¬∃z ′ E z (R(s, n, z ′))g
which is equivalent to
¬¬∃˜z∃z ′ E z (R(s, n, z ′))g .
Clearly, it follows that¬¬∃z (R(s, n, z))g which is equivalent to A(s, n). Hence, from this observation together with (Hyp3)g ,
it follows that
∀s, n ¬¬A(s, n, n)→ (Q (s, n, n))g .
Altogether, from the negative translations of the hypothesis Hyp1–Hyp4, we got
∀s∃n¬¬ A(s, n, n)
∀s, n∀m ≤ n (¬¬A(s,m,m)→ ¬¬A(s, n, n))
∀s, n ¬¬A(s, n, n)→ (Q (s, n, n))g
∀s, n ∀x (Q (s, n ∗ x, n+ 1))g → (Q (s, n, n))g .
Using bar induction, it follows that (Q (0, 0))g , as desired.
Using the soundness theorem,we getHAωE+BR+∆Mω ⊢

(BI∃bd)g
B and by the characterization theoremof the bounded
functional interpretation for the classical case, we have PAωE + BR+ Pωbd[E] ⊢ BI∃bd ↔

(BI∃bd)g
B. Clearly, it follows
PAωE + BR+ Pωbd[E] +∆Mω ⊢ BI∃bd. 
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We will now prove that this restricted form of bar induction is enough to show that the axiom of dependent choices
holds in the classical case.
Let the axiom of dependent choices, DCω , be given by
DCρ : ∀xρ∃yρ A(x, y)→ ∀wρ∃f 0→ρ f 0 =ρ w ∧ ∀n0 A(fn, f (n+ 1)) ,
where A is an arbitrary formula of the language. We denote the dependent choice axiom for universal bounded matrices
by DCω∀bd.
Theorem 12.
PAωE + Pωbd[E] ⊢ BI∃bd → DCω∀bd.
Proof. Suppose that ∀xρ∃yρ A(x, y) where A is a universal bounded statement. Fix wρ . Then, there exists w′ also of type ρ
such that A(w,w′).
Given n0 and s0→ρ , define P and Q by
P(s, n) := ∃i ≤ n ¬A((w ∗ w′ ∗ s)i, (w ∗ w′ ∗ s)(i+ 1)),
Q (s, n) := P(s, n).
Recall that given the hypothesis Hyp1–Hyp4 (of BI∃bd) for P (existential bounded formula) and Q , we conclude Q (0, 0).
We proceed by showing that the negation of Q (0, 0) is proved, as well as Hyp2–Hyp4, implying that¬Hyp1 holds.
The negation of Q (0, 0) is
¬∃i ≤ 0 ¬A((w ∗ w′ ∗ 0)i, (w ∗ w′ ∗ 0)(i+ 1)),
which is equivalent to A(w,w′) and, clearly, satisfied.
The hypotheses Hyp2 and Hyp3 are trivial. To prove Hyp4, take s0→ρ and n0 and assume ∀xρ Q (s, n ∗ x, n+ 1), i.e,
∀x∃i ≤ n+ 1 ¬A((w ∗ w′ ∗ (s, n ∗ x))i, (w ∗ w′ ∗ (s, n ∗ x))(i+ 1)).
Equivalently
∀x ∃i ≤ n ¬A((w ∗ w′ ∗ (s, n ∗ x))i, (w ∗ w′ ∗ (s, n ∗ x))(i+ 1))
∨¬A((w ∗ w′ ∗ (s, n ∗ x))(n+ 1), (w ∗ w′ ∗ (s, n ∗ x))(n+ 2))
and, as a consequence, we get
∀x ∃i ≤ n ¬A((w ∗ w′ ∗ s, n)i, (w ∗ w′ ∗ s, n)(i+ 1)) ∨ ¬A(s(n− 1), x).
This entails that either we have Q (s, n, n) or ∀x ¬A(s(n − 1), x). By the hypothesis ∀x∃y A(x, y), clearly it follows that
Q (s, n, n).
Hence, by BI∃bd, we have concluded that in PAωE + Pωbd, ¬Hyp1 holds, i.e, ¬∀s∃n P(s, n, n).
Equivalently, we have
∃s∀n∀i ≤ n A((w ∗ w′ ∗ s, n)i, (w ∗ w′ ∗ s, n)(i+ 1))
and, in particular,
∃s∀n A((w ∗ w′ ∗ s, n)n, (w ∗ w′ ∗ s, n)(n+ 1)).
Define f by
fn =

w if n = 0
w′ if n = 1
s(n− 2) if n ≥ 2.
Using the negation of Hyp1, we conclude that f 0 = w ∧ ∀n A(fn, f (n+ 1)). 
From dependent choices for universal bounded matrices it is now easy to prove that dependent choices for arbitrary
matrices holds in PAωE + Pωbd.
Theorem 13.
PAωE + Pωbd[E] ⊢ DCω∀bd → DCω.
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Proof. Assume DC∀bd holds in PAωE + Pωbd and suppose we have ∀x∃y A(x, y) where A(x, y) is an arbitrary formula of the
language.
By the characterization theorem for the direct bounded functional interpretation, it follows ∀x∃y∀˜b∃˜c AU(x, y, b, c) and
the monotone bounded choice,mACωbd entails
∀x∃y∃˜f ∀˜b∃˜c E fb AU(x, y, b, c).
Trivially, we have
∀x, g∃y, f

f E f ∧ ∀˜b∃˜c E fb AU(x, y, b, c)

.
To ease reading, let f E f ∧∀˜b∃˜c E fb AU(x, y, b, c) be denoted by B(x, g, y, f ), which is clearly a universal bounded formula.
Hence, we have ∀x, g∃y, f B(x, g, y, f ). By dependent choices for universal bounded matrices, it follows
∀w, h∃p, ψ (p0 = w ∧ ψ0 = h ∧ ∀n B(pn, ψn, p(n+ 1), ψ(n+ 1)))
which is equivalent to
∀w, h∃p, ψ p0 = w ∧ ψ0 = h ∧ ∀n ψ(n+ 1) E ψ(n+ 1) ∧ ∀˜b∃˜c E ψ(n+ 1)b AU(pn, p(n+ 1), b, c).
Then
∀w, h∃p, ψ p0 = w ∧ ψ0 = h ∧ ∀n ψ(n+ 1) E ψ(n+ 1) ∧ ∀˜b∃˜c AU(pn, p(n+ 1), b, c)
and, by the characterization theorem, we obtain
∀w, h∃p, ψ (p0 = w ∧ ψ0 = h ∧ ∀n (ψ(n+ 1) E ψ(n+ 1) ∧ A(pn, p(n+ 1))))
and this entails ∀w∃p (p0 = w ∧ ∀n A(pn, p(n+ 1))), as desired. 
Using the previous results, the theory PAωE + DCω + Pωbd[E] has a bounded functional interpretation by bar recursive
functionals which is verifiable in HAωE + BR + ∆Mω . Furthermore, the axiom of dependent choices entails AC0,ω which is
the form of choice given by ∀n0∃x A(n, x)→ ∃f ∀n A(n, fn) for arbitrary formulas A (x can be of any type). The author is very
grateful to Fernando Ferreira for providing a proof for this result.
Lemma 14.
HAω ⊢ DCω → AC0,ω.
Proof. Take an arbitrary formula A and assume ∀n0∃xσ A(n, x). Trivially, we have
∀n, x∃m, y (m = n+ 1 ∧ A(m, y))
and by DCω , it follows that for allw1 andw2 we have
∃f , g (f 0 = w1 ∧ g0 = w2 ∧ ∀n (f (n+ 1) = f (n)+ 1 ∧ A (f (n+ 1), g(n+ 1))))
and, clearly,
∃f , g (f 0 = 0 ∧ g0 = x0 ∧ ∀n (f (n+ 1) = f (n)+ 1 ∧ A (f (n+ 1), g(n+ 1))))
for x0 such that A(0, x0). It is now a straightforward observation that f (n) = n for all n and that ∃g∀n A(n, gn). 
Since for full numerical comprehension, CA0, is a consequence of AC0,ω , from Lemma 14 we have our last result:
Theorem 15. Let A(z) be a formula of the language of PAωE with free variables z, and assume that (A
g)B (z) is ∃˜b∀˜c (Ag)B(z, b, c).
If
PAωE + CA0 + Pωbd[E] ⊢ A(z)
then there exist monotone closed terms t of appropriate type such that
HAωE + BR+∆Mω ⊢ ∀˜a∀z E a∀˜c (Ag)B(z, ta, c).
Moreover,Mω  ∀˜a∀z ≤∗ a∀˜c (Ag)B(z, ta, c).
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